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Abstract
We model the influence of sharing large exogeneous losses to the reinsurance market by a
bipartite graph. Using Pareto-tailed claims and multivariate regular variation we obtain asymp-
totic results for the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation. We show that the
dependence on the network structure plays a fundamental role in their asymptotic behaviour.
As is well-known in a non-network setting, if the Pareto exponent is larger than 1, then for the
individual agent (reinsurance company) diversification is beneficial, whereas when it is less than
1, concentration on a few objects is the better strategy.
An additional aspect of this paper is the amount of uninsured losses which have to be
convered by society. In the situation of networks of agents, in our setting diversification is never
detrimental concerning the amount of uninsured losses. If the Pareto-tailed claims have finite
mean, diversification turns out to be never detrimental, both for society and for individual
agents. In contrast, if the Pareto-tailed claims have infinite mean, a conflicting situation may
arise between the incentives of individual agents and the interest of some regulator to keep risk
for society small. We explain the influence of the network structure on diversification effects in
different network scenarios.
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1 Introduction
Over the last years, risk modelling has increasingly taken the fact into account that agents are
related through an interwoven network of business relationships, see [11, 16, 20, 25, 28, 29] to
mention just a few among a rapidly increasing number of articles on the topic. For a financial
market the notion systemic risk is often applied to model endogeneous risk in a (banking)
network leading to cascading behaviour.
Insurance risk is of a different flavour, since exogeneous risks play the essential role, although
the market system covering jointly these risks, may also have some influence (cf. [4, 37]). Yet,
the specific nature of the extremal dependence structure between large losses, as they may for
example happen in markets for catastrophe insurance, has not yet been taken into account in
such models. This paper contributes to filling this gap and we understand risk here as the risk
to the proper functioning of the system; see [46]. We refer to this not only by studying the role
of risk sharing for reinsurance agents in different market situations but also by evaluating the
extent of large losses which are not covered by the reinsurance industry and hence remain to
the society, cf. [44]. A main feature of insurance risks is that they are heavy-tailed, while often
obeying a law of regular variation.
Regular variation is a powerful tool which can and has been used in many areas of applied
probability. In particular, it is a standard concept in insurance risk models with focus on the ruin
probability as a risk measure. Whereas one-dimensional risk processes have been studied since
Crame´r introduced the compound Poisson insurance risk processes in the 1930s, ruin problems
for multivariate models are somewhat scattered in the literature. For instance, [31] study ruin
problems for an insurance company with multiple business lines allowing for capital transfer
between these lines. They investigate so-called ruin regions; i.e. some far out set in Rd such
that the multivariate risk process hits (for some time t > 0 or some time t ∈ (0, T )) this set
with very small probability. This leads to some rules for risk and capital transfer to possibly
avoid insolvency. Similar problems of optimal reserve allocation have also been considered in
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this context; see for example [8]. The leading model in these papers are multivariate compound
Poisson processes with some rather restricted dependence structure between the claims in the
different business lines (cf. Section 4 of [31]). The ruin problem in a linear portfolio of insurance
risk processes has also been investigated in [13], where the risk processes may again represent
business lines or different companies. Dependence between the risk processes is modeled by a
Clayton dependence structure, which allows for scenarios reaching from weak to very strong
dependence. Much more general Le´vy models have been investigated in [23, 24], where the
probabilistic sample path behaviour leading to ruin is described. Risk assessment in a class of
networks with two types of participants, insurance and reinsurance companies, is modelled with
the goal of simulating scenarios in [10]. It is assumed that the claim sizes have a linear factor
model structure with Pareto-tailed factors. Assumptions are further that contractual relation-
ships remain constant, when there is no default, and reduce to a subgraph, if default occurs.
The authors adopt an equilibrium approach closely related to the market clearing framework
established in [25].
Moreover, a famous result in graph theory by [3] was recently extended in [43] and ensures
that in a preferential attachment model the in- and out-degrees are multivariate regularly vary-
ing. For such power-law financial networks [2] give conditions under which a higher order cascade
dies out.
Our results build on this literature and extend it to a market setting. The main aim of
this paper is to assess the effect of networks on high losses under general assumptions on the
insurance risks. Our model assumes a finite set of agents (reinsurance companies), and a finite
set of objects. We think of each object as a pool of highly dependent risks which cause a severe
loss if one common triggering event happens. To give examples, we could think of object 1 as a
portfolio of household insurances in a particular hurricane region in the U.S. Object 2 could be
a pool of life insurances in Western Europe which might cause a large claim in case an epidemic
happens, and Object 3 might be related to an earthquake in Japan. Often, we consider the
object claims to be asymptotically stochastically independent, which is not a severe restriction
of generality if they either refer to different sources of risk (hurricane vs. fire) or to different
geographical regions (earthquake in Japan vs. earthquake in California). If an object is chosen
by some agent then it is at least partly insured. In a realisation of the network, some objects
may not be insured, which happens also in reality, e.g. in less developed regions of the world. An
object generates a loss with a Pareto-tail if it gets severely damaged. Then the loss is distributed
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Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of the reinsurance market as a bipartite graph.
across all agents insuring that object.
Hence we use a bipartite graph as in Figure 1 to model the structure of the reinsurance
market; this model strongly resembles the depiction of the reinsurance market in Figure 21 of
[32].
While our underlying structure is a bipartite graph of agent-object relationships, we mainly
focus on the agents and their exposure in the analysis as well as the amount of uninsured risk
which has to be covered by society.
This model is intentionally very simple and does not attempt to capture the minutiae of
the reinsurance market. In particular the model does not reflect the fact that reinsurers may
reinsure one another, potentially leading to spiralling effects, see for example [4]. The reason
to exclude this effect is that retrocession nowadays covers just a small fraction of the overall
reinsured risk, see [32], p. 26. Instead our model focuses on the effect of the network between
agents and objects on risk assessment. This paper could serve as a starting point for further
investigations including balance sheets and address risk allocation.
In this paper we address the following questions: Taking network effects into account, when
is it beneficial for an agent to diversify, and when is it beneficial to concentrate on a few objects?
From a macroscopic viewpoint, when is it beneficial to have highly diversified agents, and when
would it be beneficial that agents focus only on a few objects instead? Here the benefit is judged
according to the Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation of individual agents as well as
the whole system which allow us to take the macro-prudential and the micro-prudential view.
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The use of bipartite networks has been successful in the area of common asset holdings, see
for example [12, 17]. While [12] assesses price impacts on assets due to shocks to other assets,
[17] uses a stylized mechanism to quantify bankruptcy cascades. We will instead concentrate on
determining extremal dependence structures of losses with Pareto-tails using the framework of
multivariate regular variation. Note that regular variation techniques have already been applied
to the problem of portfolio diversification with respect to heavy-tailed risks; see for example [33,
38, 45]. Our results build on this literature and extend it to a network setup. While previous
research considers standard portfolios of different risk factors without any network structure,
we model the whole market of various portfolios and describe their dependence structure, which
is determined by the bipartite random graph.
In more detail, our random bipartite graph is constructed as follows. We have a vertex set of
agents A of cardinality q as well as a vertex set of objects O of cardinality d. Each vertex (agent)
i ∈ A chooses a number of objects from O to which it is linked, where each object j ∈ O is chosen
independently with probability pij ∈ [0, 1] (thus including the case of a deterministic graph).
Different agents choose their object sets independently from each other. Let Vj for j = 1, . . . , d
have Pareto-tails determining the claim, if object j gets severely damaged, so that, for possibly
different Kj > 0 and tail index α > 0,
P (Vj > t) ∼ Kjt−α, t→∞. (1.1)
(For two functions f and g we write f(t) ∼ g(t) as t→∞ if limt→∞ f(t)/g(t) = 1.) We summa-
rize all claims in the vector V = (V1, . . . , Vd)
> and assume that this vector is independent of the
random graph construction, while V1, . . . , Vd may not be independent of each other. Obviously,
losses may have different tail indices α. Although to require the same α seems restrictive, indeed
it is not. Two remarks are in order:
(i) If loss categories have different α’s, then the famous Breiman result [14] ensures that the
aggregated losses have a tail behaviour corresponding to the smallest α: the largest losses
dominate. As a prerequisite of our analysis we would estimate α for each object and a
statistical test would lead to the relevant subclass of objects to be analysed.
(ii) On the other hand, if we want to include also the less severe losses into our analysis, we
can unify all marginal tails for instance to the smallest α (similar as for copulas) and base
our analysis on the full sample (cf. Proposition 5.10 of [40].).
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Let fi(Vj) now be the proportion of the loss of object j which affects agent i. We assume
that the loss is distributed across all agents insuring object j, and we indicate that agent i holds
some insurance risk on object j by 1(i ∼ j). Then
fi(Vj) = 1(i ∼ j)WijVj .
The weights Wij ≥ 0 indicate the proportion of claim j agent i ensures and may also be random,
and could be coupled to the random network structure. The sum
∑q
i=1Wij1(i ∼ j) gives the
total part of object j which is insured. Let Fi :=
∑d
j=1 fi(Vj) denote the exposure of agent i and
F = (F1, . . . , Fq)
>. We represent the insurance relations through the weighted q × d adjacency
matrix A = (Aij)
q,d
i,j=1 with
Aij = 1(i ∼ j)Wij . (1.2)
We detail some specific cases of the weights Wij after Theorem 3.2. As a consequence of (1.2)
we can represent the vector of exposures of the q agents as
F = AV. (1.3)
Our model is related to the reinsurance network model in [37], where the relationship be-
tween primary insurers and reinsurers is modelled instead of the relationship between objects
and reinsurers; there, an insurer’s risky asset is modelled as normally distributed. The crucial
difference is that our model includes the heavy-tailed nature of the losses, which requires a very
different treatment.
The Pareto-tails allow us to assess the exposure of an agent, the vector of exposures of all
agents as well as the aggregated exposures, defined by the norm of the exposure vector. Here
and throughout the paper ‖ · ‖ is a norm in Rd or Rq such that all canonical unit vectors have
norm 1. We will show at the end of Section 3 that the effect of the network structure on the
Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation, given the tail index α of the Pareto-tailed
claims, is solely contained in the constants
Ciind = C
i
ind(A) :=
d∑
j=1
KjE Aαij , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSind = CSind(A) =
d∑
j=1
KjE ‖Aej‖α,
(1.4)
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when the Pareto-tailed claims are independent; the superscript i indicates the individual setting
of agent i, whereas S refers to the systemic setting in the sense that the system of all agents
and objects is taken into account. We contrast this with the fully dependent case. Defining the
d× d diagonal matrix K1/α = diag(K1/α1 , . . . ,K1/αd ), the corresponding quantities are
Cidep = C
i
dep(A) := E(AK1/α1)αi , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSdep = CSdep(A) = E‖AK1/α1‖α,
(1.5)
where 1 is the d−dimensional vector with entries all equal 1. In general, small constants are
more desirable, indicating a smaller risk. The case of fully dependent claims is equivalent to
having a single source of loss, but the loss to be unevenly distributed among the agents.
As [33, 38, 45], we find that for every individual agent diversification is beneficial, whereas
in the case that α < 1 so that the risks have infinite mean, concentration on a few objects is the
better strategy. From the perspective of a society, however, uninsured losses are not desirable.
The better connected and consequently more diversified markets are, the fewer uninsured losses
would be expected. Thus, if α < 1 there is a conflict between an agent’s wish not to diversify
and the society’s wish to have all of the objects insured. If α > 1 then the individual agent’s
wishes and the society’s need for risks to be covered agree.
To disentangle the different factors which enter into the risk calculations, namely the de-
pendence information and the degree of heavy-tailedness of exogeneous losses as well as the
network structure of the reinsurers with the objects, our paper is organised as follows. Section
2 collates results from multivariate regular variation. In Section 3 we review and derive specific
asymptotic results for the regular variation of F under a general dependence structure for V ,
and then we consider the special cases that V has asymptotically independent components, and
that V has asymptotically fully dependent components. Here the (random) network structure
enters as a (stochastic) linear transformation of the claims vector V . We apply our results to the
risk measures Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation. This section also states bounds
for general dependence structures. Section 4 discusses the effect of the network on the risk mea-
sures and gives some examples for bipartite network models. We prove Poisson approximations
of relevant constants for a large market. While most of the examples in this section use the
7
matrix A with
Aij =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
, where
0
0
:= 0, (1.6)
and ‖·‖ the 1-norm, we conclude the section with a discussion of the use of an arbitrary r−norm
with r > 1 or r−quasinorm with r < 1 as aggregation function for the risk in the market.
2 Preliminaries from multivariate regular variation
Our framework is that of regular variation of the random vector of exposures F , which follows
from the Pareto-tailed claims and the dependence structure introduced by the bipartite graph.
We start with a set of equivalent definitions; cf. Theorem 6.1 of [41], and Ch. 2.1 of [6]. For
d ∈ N, Sd−1+ = {x ∈ Rd+ : ‖x‖ = 1} is the positive part of the unit sphere in Rd with respect to
the norm ‖ · ‖. We denote by 0 the d−dimensional vector with entries all equal to 0, and write
for short
E := Rd+ \ {0}
with R+ = [0,∞]. Moreover, we denote by B = B(E) the Borel σ-algebra with respect to the
so-called one point uncompactification, cf. [41], Section 6.1.3. In this topology, the compact sets
are exactly the sets which are compact in Rd+ and which do not contain the zero vector 0. In
particular, sets of the form (x,∞] for x ∈ Rd+ \ {0} are relatively compact and bounded sets in
this topology are the sets which are bounded away from the origin. We say that a sequence of
Radon measures (νn)n∈N on B converges vaguely to a Radon measure ν on B, for short νn v→ ν,
if
∫
E fdνn →
∫
E fdν as n → ∞ for all measurable functions f on E which are continuous with
compact support. For equivalent definitions of vague convergence see Proposition 3.12 in [40].
Definition 2.1. A random vector X with state space E is called multivariate regularly varying
if one of the following equivalent conditions holds:
(i) There is a Radon measure µ 6≡ 0 on B with µ(Rd+ \Rd+) = 0 and a relatively compact Borel
set D ∈ B such that tD is bounded away from zero and µ(∂tD) = 0 for t in a dense subset T of
(0,∞) and
P(X ∈ t·)
P(X ∈ tD)
v→ µ(·), t→∞. (2.1)
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In that case there exists some α > 0 such that the limit measure is homogeneous of order −α:
µ(uS) = u−αµ(S)
for every S ∈ B satisfying µ(∂S) = 0. The measure µ is called intensity measure of X. Note
that µ has no atoms.
(ii) There is a Radon measure ν 6≡ 0 on B and a sequence bn →∞ so that
nP
(X
bn
∈ ·
)
v→ ν(·), n→∞. (2.2)
The measure ν is homogeneous of the same order α as µ in (i), and is called the exponent
measure of X.
(iii) There is a probability measure ρ 6≡ 0 on B(Sd−1+ ) such that for some α > 0
P(‖X‖ > tu,X/‖X‖ ∈ ·)
P(‖X‖ > t)
v→ u−αρ(·), t→∞, (2.3)
for every u > 0. The index α is the same as in (i) and (ii). The measure ρ is called the spectral
measure of X.
The tail index α > 0 is also called the index of regular variation of X, and we write X ∈ R(−α).

There is a certain choice in the normalization of the left hand sides of (2.1) (the choice of D)
and (2.2) (the choice of bn). As an example consider the one-dimensional case of a Pareto-tail
as in (1.1). If we choose bn ∼ (K1n)1/α, then
nP
(
V1 > (K1n)
1/αt
)
∼ n(K1n)−1K1t−α = t−α, n→∞.
Alternatively, we can choose bn ∼ n1/α and obtain
nP
(
V1 > n
1/αt
)
∼ K1t−α, n→∞. (2.4)
We will use the second normalization, applying the same bn to each vector component of V , and
retain the different constants Kj in the limit.
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The measures µ, ν and ρ all assess the dependence structure of the multivariate vector V in
the limit. If µ, ν and ρ have only mass on the axes, then they correspond to independence, and
we say the components of V are asymptotically independent. If the mass is concentrated only
on the line {sK1/α1 : s > 0}, then µ, ν and ρ correspond to full dependence, and we say V is
asymptotically fully dependent. We present the corresponding measures ν and µ in Lemmas 2.2
and 2.3 below; cf. Section 6.5.1 in [41].
Lemma 2.2. Assume that the vector V := (V1, . . . , Vd)
>, whose components have Pareto-tails
as in (1.1), belongs to R(−α). Define bn := n1/α and let x = (x1, . . . , xd)>. Then the exponent
measure ν from (2.2) of V is given by
(a) ν([0, x]c) =
∑d
j=1Kjx
−α
j if the components of V are asymptotically independent, and
(b) ν([0, x]c) = maxj=1,...,d{Kjx−αj } if V is asymptotically fully dependent.
Proof. Proof: Define V ∗ := (K−1/α1 V1, . . . ,K
−1/α
d Vd)
>, then all component have the same
Pareto-tail P (K
−1/α
j Vj > t) ∼ t−α as t→∞ for j = 1, . . . , d. If we denote by ν∗ the exponent
measure of V ∗, then by (6.31) and (6.32) of [41] ν∗([0, x]c) =
∑d
i=1 x
−α
i if the components of
V ∗ are asymptotically independent, and ν∗([0, x]c) =
(
mini=1,...,d xi
)−α
if V ∗ is asymptotically
fully dependent. To obtain the exponent measure of V we summarize the different coefficients
in the diagonal matrix K1/α = diag(K
1/α
1 , . . . ,K
1/α
d ). Then ν = ν
∗ ◦K−1/α and we obtain
ν([0, x]c) = ν∗ ◦K−1/α([0, x]c) = ν∗([0,K−1/αx]c),
giving (a) and (b) above.
Lemma 2.3. Assume that the vector V := (V1, . . . , Vd)
>, whose components have Pareto-tails
as in (1.1), belongs to R(−α). Consider the intensity measure µ from (2.1) with D = {x ∈
Rd+ : ‖x‖ > 1} = {‖x‖ > 1} and the exponent measure ν as in Lemma 2.2. Then
(a) µ({‖x‖ > 1}) = 1 and µ(·) = ν(·)
ν({‖x‖ > 1}) .
(b) P (‖V ‖ > t) ∼ ν({‖x‖ > 1})t−α as t→∞.
(c) ν({‖x‖ > 1}) = ∑dj=1Kj, if the components of V are asymptotically independent.
(d) ν({‖x‖ > 1}) = ‖K1/α1‖α, if the components of V are fully dependent.
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Proof. Proof: (a) From (2.1) it follows that µ(D) = 1. The convergence nP
(
b−1n V ∈ ·
) v→ ν(·)
of (2.2) with bn = b(n) = n
1/α yields with continuous parameter t
lim
t→∞ t
αP (V ∈ t[0, x]c) = ν([0, x]c),
see [41], p. 175. Consequently,
lim
t→∞
tαP (V ∈ t[0, x]c)
P (V ∈ t[0, 1]c) tα =
ν([0, x]c)
ν([0, 1]c)
. (2.5)
Additionally, employing Lemma 6.1 from [41] and noting the relative compactness of {‖x‖ > 1},
lim
t→∞
P (‖V ‖ > t)
P (V ∈ t[0, 1]c) =
ν({‖x‖ > 1})
ν([0, 1]c)
. (2.6)
Putting relations (2.5) and (2.6) together leads for fixed x0 6= 0 to
ν([0, x0]
c)
ν([0, 1]c)
= lim
t→∞
P (V ∈ t[0, x0]c)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
P (V ∈ t[0, 1]c) = µ([0, x0]
c)
ν({‖x‖ > 1})
ν({[0, 1]c}) ,
which gives (a) and (b).
In order to prove (c) and (d) we have to calculate the specific form of ν({‖x‖ > 1}) for the vector
V . Denote by ν∗ the exponent measure of (K−1/α1 V1, . . . ,K
−1/α
d Vd)
>, and recall the matrix
K1/α = diag(K
1/α
1 , . . . ,K
1/α
d ). Then for the asymptotically independent case we calculate
ν({‖x‖ > 1}) = ν∗ ◦K−1/α({x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖ > 1})
= ν∗({x ∈ Rd : ‖K1/αx‖ > 1})
=
d∑
j=1
ν∗
({tej ∈ Rd : t > K−1/αj }) = d∑
j=1
Kj ,
and for the asymptotically fully dependent case we obtain with (1.1)
ν({‖x‖ > 1}) = ν∗({t1 : t‖K1/α1‖ > 1}) = ‖K1/α1‖α.
11
3 Regular variation of F
We assume the vector V of claims to be multivariate regularly varying with tail index α > 0,
which is for example trivially the case if the marginals have Pareto-tails with tail index α
(as in (1.1)) and are either asymptotically independent or fully dependent. We now turn to
the multivariate vector F = AV of exposures of all agents. In this section, we determine the
dependence measures of F , the asymptotics of probabilities of joint marginal exceedances as
well as the asymptotics of exceedances of the aggregated vector F in form of a norm of F , all in
dependence of the law of the random matrix A representing the market structure. We then apply
our findings to Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectations as tools for risk management.
3.1 Dependence measures of F and asymptotics
We start with some notation. Recall that ‖ · ‖ denotes a norm on Rd or Rq satisfying ‖ej‖ = 1
for all unit vectors. We abbreviate the cone
C1,Sq−1+
:= {x ∈ Rq+ : ‖x‖ > 1}.
The support of the random matrix A is
supp(A) := {M ∈ Rq×d : P (A = M) > 0}.
Further, for x ∈ Rq the Hamming distance between x and 0 is given by
|x|H := |{i ∈ {1, . . . , q} : xi 6= 0}|.
The following result, based on Proposition A.1 of [7], ensures regular variation of F = AV . Note
that we use a different normalization compared to [7].
Proposition 3.1. Let V := (V1, . . . , Vd)
> have components with Pareto-tails P(Vj > t) ∼ Kjt−α
as t→∞ for Kj , α > 0 as in (1.1) with intensity measure µ as in (2.1) (with D = {x ∈ Rd+ :
‖x‖ > 1}) and exponent measure ν as in (2.2) (with bn = n1/α). Then the random vector
F = AV as in (1.3) belongs to R(−α). Moreover, the following assertions hold:
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(a) For all u > 0
P (F ∈ t·)
P (‖F‖ > t)
v→ µ(·), t→∞, (3.1)
where the intensity measure of F is given by
µ(·) = (Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ ))−1Eµ ◦A−1(·) (3.2)
on B(Rq+ \ {0}); i.e. µ is a probability measure on C1,Sq−1+ . Moreover, µ is homogeneous of order
−α.
(b) For all u > 0
P(‖F‖ > ut, F/‖F‖ ∈ ·)
P(‖F‖ > t)
v→ u−αρ(·), t→∞,
where the spectral measure of F is given by
ρ(·) =
(
Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ )
)−1
Eµ ◦A−1
({
‖x‖ > 1, x‖x‖ ∈ ·
})
, t→∞, (3.3)
on B(Sq−1+ ); i.e., it is a probability measure on the sphere Sq−1+ .
Proof. Proof: (a) Proposition A.1 of [7] ensures that F ∈ R(−α) and that
P (F ∈ t·)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
v→ Eµ ◦A−1(·), t→∞.
This implies
P (F ∈ tu ·)
P(‖F‖ > t)
P (‖F‖ > t)
P (‖V ‖ > t)
v→ u−αEµ ◦A−1(·), t→∞,
as well as
P (‖F‖ > t)
P (‖V ‖ > t) → Eµ ◦A
−1(C1,Sq−1+ ), t→∞. (3.4)
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which gives (3.2). Moreover, homogeneity holds, since
Eµ({x : Ax ∈ u·}) = Eµ(u{x : Ax ∈ ·}) = u−αEµ({x : Ax ∈ ·}).
Part (b) is a consequence of (3.1) and (3.2).
In what follows we focus on the two scenarios of asymptotically independent and asymptot-
ically fully dependent claims V1, . . . , Vd. They will play an important role as asymptotic upper
and lower bounds for the individual and market risk as we will make precise in Section 3.3. We
can now present the tails of the exposure of the individual agents.
Theorem 3.2. (a) For the marginals Fi = Ai·V , i = 1, . . . , q, of F we obtain
P (Fi > t) ∼ Ct−α, t→∞, (3.5)
with C = Ciind =
∑d
j=1KjEAαij (as in (1.4)), if V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent,
and
with Cidep = E(AK1/α1)αi (as in (1.5)), if V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically fully dependent.
(b) For any subset {i1, . . . , ik} of {1, . . . , q} and any choice of positive u1, . . . , uk we obtain
P (Fi1 > u1t, . . . , Fik > ukt) ∼
d∑
j=1
KjE
(
min
{Ai1j
u1
, . . . ,
Aikj
uk
})α
t−α, t→∞, (3.6)
in the case of asymptotically independent V1, . . . , Vd, and
P (Fi1 > u1t, . . . , Fik > ukt) ∼ E
(
min
{ (AK1/α1)i1
u1
, . . . ,
(AK1/α1)ik
uk
})α
t−α, t→∞,
(3.7)
in the case of asymptotically fully dependent V1, . . . , Vd.
(c) For the aggregated exposures ‖F‖ we obtain
P(‖F‖ > t) ∼ Ct−α, t→∞, (3.8)
with C = CSind =
∑d
j=1KjE‖Aej‖α (as in (1.4)), if V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically indepen-
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dent, and
with C = CSdep = E‖AK1/α1‖α (as in (1.5)), if V1, . . . , Vd are fully dependent claims.
Proof. Proof: The two relations summarized in (3.5) are particular cases of (3.6) and (3.7). For
a proof of (3.6) we note first that by (3.1) and (3.4)
P (Fi1 > u1t, . . . , Fik > ukt) ∼ Eµ ◦A−1({x : xi1 > u1, . . . , xik > uk})P (‖V ‖ > t)
and proceed, using µ = (
∑d
j=1Kj)
−1ν from Lemma 2.3(c), with
Eµ({x : (Ax)i1 > u1, . . . , (Ax)ik > uk})
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
Eν∗
({
sej : s > max
{ u1
K
1/α
j Ai1j
, . . . ,
uk
K
1/α
j Aikj
}})
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
E
(
min
{K1/αj Ai1j
u1
, . . . ,
K
1/α
j Aikj
uk
})α
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
KjE
(
min
{Ai1j
u1
, . . . ,
Aikj
uk
})α
.
We find from Lemma 2.3(b) that P (‖V ‖ > t) ∼ ν({‖x‖ > 1})t−α ∼ ∑dj=1Kjt−α, which com-
pletes the proof of (3.6).
Relation (3.7) is shown analogously incorporating that the respective exponent measure for
fully dependent variables is concentrated on {sK1/α1 : s > 0}, in particular, P (‖V ‖ > t) ∼
‖K1/α1‖αt−α as t→∞.
Relation (3.8) follows from Proposition 3.1(a), if we take into account that
Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ ) = (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1CSind and Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ ) = ‖K
1/α1‖−αCSdep (3.9)
for asymptotically independent and asymptotically fully dependent claims V1, . . . , Vd.
These general results on regular variation are independent of the specific form of the matrix
A as given in (1.2). When we want, however, to compute the dependence measures like the
spectral measure explicitly, the specific form of (1.2) becomes relevant. If deg(j) denotes the
15
number of agents insuring object j, then for the choice of A as in (1.6);
Aij =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
, where
0
0
:= 0,
the loss is evenly distributed across all agents insuring object j. For such A the relation (3.6)
shows that the joint tail behaviour of Fi and Fk is asymptotically independent if the correspond-
ing different agents i and k do not insure any object jointly.
If A is as in (1.6), then we can calculate the spectral measure explicitly as follows.
Corollary 3.3. Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 hold, let A be as in (1.6), and assume
that the claims V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent. Then the spectral measure ρ of F has
support given by
supp(ρ) ⊆ S = {‖x‖−1x : x ∈ {0, 1}q \ {0}} ; (3.10)
i.e., ρ is concentrated on at most 2q−1 many points on the sphere. Setting CSind =
∑d
j=1KjE‖Aej‖α
(as in (1.4)), we get for b = (b1, . . . , bq) ∈ S
ρ({b}) = (CSind)−1
∥∥∥∥ (1(b1 > 0), . . . ,1(bq > 0))>|b|H
∥∥∥∥α d∑
j=1
Kj
q∏
i=1
p
1(bi>0)
ij (1− pij)1(bi=0). (3.11)
Proof. Proof: Recall that, by independence, the spectral measure of V is concentrated on the
intersections of the sphere with the axes. Hence, the spectral measure ρ of F is concentrated on
{
‖MK1/αej‖−1MK1/αej : j = 1, . . . , d;Mej 6= 0; M ∈ supp(A)
}
⊆ {‖x‖−1x : x ∈ {0, 1}q \ {0}} ,
hence, (3.10) follows. To prove (3.11), we use that ν and µ are concentrated on the axes and
conclude from Lemma 2.3(a),
Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ ) = Eµ({x ∈ R
d
+ : Ax ∈ C1,Sq−1+ })
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1Eν({x ∈ Rd+ : Ax ∈ C1,Sq−1+ })
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1Eν∗ ◦K−1/α({x ∈ Rd+ : ‖Ax‖ > 1})
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= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1Eν∗({x ∈ Rd+ : ‖AK1/αx‖ > 1})
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
Eν∗({tej : t ≥ (‖AK1/αej‖)−1})
= (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1
d∑
j=1
KjE‖Aej‖α = (
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1CSind. (3.12)
Now note that for b ∈ S,
µ({tej : t > ‖Aej‖−1, ‖Aej‖−1Aej = b}) = µ({tej : t > ‖Aej‖−1})1{‖Aej‖−1Aej = b}
holds. Consequently, by homogeneity, for b ∈ S,
Eµ ◦A−1({x ∈ Rq+ : ‖x‖ ≥ 1, x/‖x‖ = b})
= Eµ({x ∈ Rd+ : ‖Ax‖ > 1, ‖Ax‖−1Ax = b})
= E
d∑
j=1
1{‖Aej‖−1Aej = b}µ({tej : t > ‖Aej‖−1})
= E
d∑
j=1
1{‖Aej‖−1Aej = b}Kj‖Aej‖α(
d∑
j=1
Kj)
−1.
Next, observe that under the condition ‖Aej‖−1Aej = b some component of b is not zero if and
only if the corresponding component of Aej is not zero. This implies
Eµ ◦A−1({x ∈ Rq+ : ‖x‖ ≥ 1, x/‖x‖ = b})
=
1∑d
j=1Kj
∥∥∥∥ (1(b1 > 0), . . . ,1(bq > 0))>|b|H
∥∥∥∥α d∑
j=1
KjP
(‖Aej‖−1Aej = b)
=
1∑d
j=1Kj
∥∥∥∥ (1(b1 > 0), . . . ,1(bq > 0))>|b|H
∥∥∥∥α d∑
j=1
Kj
q∏
i=1
p
1(bi>0)
ij (1− pij)1(bi=0),
and in view of Proposition 3.1(b) we get the result.
The support of the spectral measure will also be finite if there is full asymptotic dependence
between the claims.
Corollary 3.4. Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 hold, let A be as in (1.6), and assume
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that the claims V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically fully dependent. Then the spectral measure ρ of F
has support
supp(ρ) =
{
‖MK1/α1‖−1MK1/α1 : M1 6= 0; M ∈ supp(A)
}
. (3.13)
Setting CSdep = E‖AK1/α1‖α (as in (1.5)), it takes on B(Sq−1+ ) the form
ρ(·) = ‖K1/α1‖α(CSdep)−1Eµ ◦A−1
({
‖x‖ > 1, x‖x‖ ∈ ·
})
.
Proof. Proof: Since the spectral measure of V is concentrated on K1/α1, the spectral measure
ρ of F is concentrated on MK1/α1 for j = 1, . . . , d and M ∈ supp(A), normalized to live on the
sphere. This implies (3.13). From Lemma 2.3(a) with (d) we conclude,
Eµ ◦A−1(C1,Sq−1+ ) = Eµ({x ∈ R
d
+ : Ax ∈ C1,Sq−1+ })
= ‖K1/α1‖−αE‖AK1/α1‖α = ‖K1/α1‖−αCSdep. (3.14)
Using this, we find from Proposition 3.1(d) and (2.3),
P(‖F‖ > ut, F/‖F‖ ∈ ·)
P(‖F‖ > t)
v→ u−α‖K1/α1‖α(CSdep)−1Eµ ◦A−1
({
‖x > 1‖, x‖x‖ ∈ ·
})
, t→∞,
on B(Sq−1+ ), giving the spectral measure ρ as above.
We end this subsection with a result concerning the tail behaviour of uninsured losses.
Proposition 3.5. Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.1 hold and assume the market matrix
entries of the form Aij = 1(i ∼ j)Wij as in (1.6) with 0 <
∑q
i=1Wij ≤ 1 for j = 1, . . . , d. Then
the tail behaviour of uninsured losses is given by
P
 d∑
j=1
(1−
q∑
i=1
Wij1(i ∼ j))Vj ≥ t
 ∼ t−αB (3.15)
with B = Bind =
∑d
j=1KjE(1 −
∑q
1=1 1(i ∼ j)Wij)α if the object claims are asymptotically
independent and B = Bdep = E(
∑d
j=1K
1/α
j (1 −
∑q
i=1Wij1(i ∼ j)))α if the object claims are
fully dependent. In the special case, where Aij = deg(j)
−11(i ∼ j), we have B = Bind :=
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∑d
j=1Kj
∏q
i=1(1−pij) and B = Bdep :=
∑
(n1,...,nd)∈{0,1}d
∏d
j=1
∏q
i=1(1−pij)njp1−njij (
∑d
j=1K
1/α
j nj)
α
Proof. Proof: Similar calculations as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 ensure that the asymptotics
(3.15) hold with the respective constants Bind and Bdep. It remains to calculate the expectations
for the specific choice Aij = deg(j)
−11(i ∼ j) in either dependence case which is standard, in
particular since we assumed each agent to choose objects independently and independent from
the choices of other agents.
Remark 3.6. Whenever Aij = deg(j)
−11(i ∼ j), then the sytemic constants CSind and CSdep
from (1.4) representing the risk of the reinsurance market add with the constants Bind and
Bdep representing uninsured losses from Proposition 3.5 to the total risk constants
∑d
j=1Kj
and (
∑d
j=1K
1/α
j )
α from Lemma 2.3; i.e.,
CSind +Bind =
d∑
j=1
Kj and C
S
dep +Bdep = (
d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j )
α.

3.2 Risk management applications
We now investigate the individual and market risk of an insurance market based on the bipartite
graph represented by the random matrix A = (Aij)
q,d
i,j=1 as in (1.2) with q agents and d objects.
Recall that an edge between an agent i and an object j exists with probability pij .
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a random variable X at confidence level 1− γ is defined as
VaR1−γ(X) := inf{t ≥ 0 : P (X > t) ≤ γ}, γ ∈ (0, 1),
and the Conditional Tail Expectation (CoTE) at confidence level 1 − γ, based on the corre-
sponding VaR, as
CoTE1−γ(X) := E[X | X > VaR1−γ(X)], γ ∈ (0, 1).
Note that the Conditional Tail Expectation is also called Expected Shortfall. We consider risk
measures of F = AV , where the random matrix A models the network structure of the market.
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The claim vector V has Pareto-tailed components, which are assumed to be either asymptotically
independent or asymptotically fully dependent. Hence, F is the multivariate regularly varying
vector of the joint exposures of the agents in the market. In order to assess the market risk we
consider VaR and Conditional Tail Expectation of some norm of the exposure vector F , where
we draw from the axiomatic set-up for systemic risk measures of [18]. In a follow-up paper
[35] we address conditional risk measures related to CoVaR (cf. [1]) and Marginal or Systemic
Expected Shortfall (cf. [15]).
Natural choices for norms are the r-norms ‖x‖r = (
∑q
i=1 |xi|r)1/r for r ≥ 1. However, for
r > 1 such a norm can have fatal economic consequences. Assume that a claim of size Vj is
distributed equally between those agents, which insure this particular claim, which corresponds
to (1.6). Then
‖AijVj‖r =
( q∑
i=1
V rj
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)r
)1/r
= V j(deg(j))
1/r−1≤Vj
with equality for r = 1 and strict inequality for r > 1 when deg(j) > 0. This behaviour would
allow for regulatory arbitrage - any loss of size Vj could be made smaller by splitting it between
more agents. We will discuss this problem further in Section 4.4.
Instead of attributing a risk measure to an agent’s exposure or to the market exposure, we
write for short an agent’s risk or the market risk. For the VaR we obtain the following.
Corollary 3.7. Let α > 0 and F = (F1, . . . , Fq)
> the vector of the agents’ exposures.
The individual Value–at–Risk of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , q} shows the asymptotic behaviour
VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0, (3.16)
with either C = Ciind or C = C
i
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or asymp-
totically fully dependent. The market Value–at–Risk of the aggregated vector ‖F‖ satisfies
VaR1−γ(‖F‖) ∼ C1/αγ−1/α, γ → 0, (3.17)
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or asymp-
totically fully dependent.
Proof. Proof: In view of Theorem 3.2, the asymptotic results (3.16) and (3.17) hold, since
inverses of regularly varying functions are again regularly varying (cf. Prop. 1.5.15 of [9]).
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The analogous result for the Conditional Tail Expectation reads as follows.
Corollary 3.8. Let α > 1 and F = (F1, . . . , Fq)
> the vector of the agents’ exposures.
The individual Conditional Tail Expectation of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} shows the asymptotic be-
haviour
CoTE1−γ(Fi) ∼ α
α− 1VaR1−γ(Fi) ∼
α
α− 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0,
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or asymp-
totically fully dependent. The market Conditional Tail Expectation of the aggregated vector ‖F‖
satisfies
CoTE1−γ(‖F‖) ∼ α
α− 1VaR1−γ(‖F‖) ∼
α
α− 1C
1/αγ−1/α , γ → 0,
with either C = CSind or C = C
S
dep in case V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent or asymp-
totically fully dependent.
Proof. Proof: Both assertions are consequences of Karamata’s Theorem (cf. Theorem 1.6.5 of
[9]) and Corollary 3.7.
3.3 Bounds for individual and market risk
Let Vind, V, Vdep be claim vectors, all three having the same margins as in (1.1), but V having
arbitrary dependence structure (Vind, Vdep are as before). Define constants
CiV = Eν ◦A−1({x : xi > t}) , i = 1, . . . , 1, and CSV = Eν ◦A−1({x : ‖x‖ > t}). (3.18)
The following bounds have been established in [34]. For the constants Ci referring to agent
i:
Ciind ≤ CiV ≤ Cidep for α ≥ 1,
Cidep ≤ CiV ≤ Ciind for α ≤ 1.
For the system constants CS the interaction of the r-norm with the parameter α leads to the
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bounds:
CSind ≤ CSV ≤ CSdep for α ≥ r,
CSdep ≤ CSV ≤ CSind for 0 < α < 1.
We want to emphasize that for α ∈ (1, r) the constants CSind and CSdep are in general neither
upper nor lower bounds for CSV ; for examples see [34].
These bounds justify concentrating on the independent case and on the fully dependent case
as the two extreme cases.
4 Network effects
In this section we discuss the influence of the graph structure on the risk, which either individual
agents or the system as a whole are exposed to. For the sake of clarity and since it is most
relevant for the type of insurance market under consideration, we mainly concentrate on the
situation that the claim variables V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent, but we point out
some differences to the fully dependent case in Figure 3. Both cases are important as they give
bounds for possible individual and market risk. Moreover, we use as natural aggregation function
the 1-norm ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖1 and A as in (1.6) so that
Aij =
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
; where
0
0
:= 0
except in Section 4.4, where we consider alternative norms and matrices.
In view of Corollaries 3.7 and 3.8, for a given tail index α, insight about the effect of the
network structure on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation, the individual
as well as the market risk, is solely contained in the constants given in (1.4) and (1.5), which
reduce in the above setting as follows. For the individual risk constants we obtain
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
KjE
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)α
and Cidep = E
( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
)α
, (4.1)
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whereas the systemic constants are computed as
CSind =
d∑
j=1
KjE
( q∑
i=1
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
)α
1(deg(j) > 0) =
d∑
j=1
KjP(deg(j) > 0), (4.2)
CSdep = E
( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j
q∑
i=1
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)
)α
= E
( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j 1(deg(j) > 0)
)α
(4.3)
Before we discuss some examples, we want to present approximations for a large system.
4.1 Poisson approximations for the constants and the number of non-
insured objects
If q and d are large then the expressions EAαij and E‖Aej‖α appearing in (1.4) may not be
easy to evaluate. Both expressions are expectations of a nonlinear function of the edge indicator
variables. The Poisson approximation below involves possibly fractional moments of the Poisson
distribution which may again not be easy to calculate, but they can be approximated efficiently
by simulation, or by numerical approximation of the convergent series.
The next proposition considers the case that all edges are independent in the underlying
graph, and P(i ∼ j) = pij .
Proposition 4.1. Let Aij =
1(i∼j)
deg(j) be as in (1.6), where {1(i ∼ j), 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤
q} are independent Bernoulli variables with E1(i ∼ j) = pij. For λij =
∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i pkj let
Xij ∼ Pois(λij) be a Poisson-distributed random variable with mean λij; let λj =
∑q
k=1 pkj and
Xj ∼ Pois(λj). Then
∣∣EAαij − pijE(1 +Xij)−α∣∣ ≤ pij min{1, (λij)−1} ∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i
p2kj , (4.4)
and, for the 1-norm,
∣∣∣CSind − d∑
j=1
Kj(1− e−λj )
∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
j=1
Kj min{1, (λj)−1}
q∑
k=1
p2kj . (4.5)
Proof. Proof: By the independence of the edges, EAαij = pijE(1 +
∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i 1(k ∼ j))−α.
We define hu : [0,∞) → [0, 1]; hu(x) = (1 + x)−α. Note that supx≥0 |hu(x)| ≤ 1. As
23
∑
k=1,...,q:k 6=i 1(k ∼ j) is a sum of independent Bernoulli variables, we may invoke Eq. (1.23),
p. 8, from [5] to obtain the first assertion. Similarly, the second assertion follows from deg(j)
being the sum of independent Bernoulli variables and Eq. (1.23), p. 8, from [5].
In particular, if
∑d
j=1Kjpij min{1, (λij)−1}
∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i p
2
kj is small, then C
i
ind is well ap-
proximated by
∑d
j=1 pijE(1 + Xij)−α, and if
∑d
j=1Kj min{1, (λj)−1}
∑q
k=1 p
2
kj is small, then
CSind is well approximated by
∑d
j=1KjEX
α(1/r−1)
j . For C
i
dep and C
S
dep the Poisson approxima-
tion yields that, with the notation of Proposition 4.1 and using a Lindeberg argument,
∣∣∣E(AK1/α1)αi −E( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j 1(i ∼ j)(1+Xij)−1
)α∣∣∣ ≤ d( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j )
α min{1, (λij)−1}
∑
k=1,...,q;k 6=i
p2kj
and as the degrees of the objects are independent due to the bipartite structure
∣∣∣CSdep − E( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j 1(Xj > 0)
)α∣∣∣ ≤ d( d∑
`=1
K
1/α
`
)α d∑
j=1
min{1, (λj)−1}
∑
k=1,...,q
p2kj .
Remark 4.2. If pij = p is identical for all i, j, and if Kj = 1 for all j, then λ
i
j = (q−1)p, λj = qp,
and the right hand bound of (4.4) simplifies to min{1, ((q − 1)p)−1}(q − 1)p3, while the right
hand bound of (4.5) becomes dmin{1, (qp)−1}qp2. For approximating Ciind we sum over all
agents, and the bound gets multiplied by d. Consider these Poisson approximations when d or q
become large. Since pkj = p is constant, if qp ≤ 1 then the Poisson approximation is good when
p is much smaller than (qd)−1/3. If qp > 1 then the Poisson approximation is good when p is
much smaller than d−1/2. The quantity qp has an immediate interpretation in networks. With
deg(j) =
∑q
i=1 1(i ∼ j) denoting the degree of an object, qp is the expected degree of an object.

Proposition 3.5 gives the behaviour of uninsured losses in terms of the network edge prob-
abilities. We can also use a Poisson approximation for the risk exposure through non-insured
objects, again using the independence of the edges.
Proposition 4.3. Let Aij be as in (1.6), Aij =
1(i∼j)
deg(j) where {1(i ∼ j), 1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ q}
are independent Bernoulli variables with E1(i ∼ j) = pij. For j = 1, . . . , d let pij =
∏q
i=1(1−pij)
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be the probability that deg(j) = 0. Let (X1, . . . , Xd) be a vector of independent Poisson variables,
where Xj has mean pij. Then
sup
t>0
∣∣∣P( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj ≥ t
)
− P
( d∑
j=1
XjVj ≥ t
)∣∣∣ ≤ d∑
j=1
pi2j . (4.6)
Whenever the claims are asymptotically independent,
P
( d∑
j=1
XjVj ≥ t
)
∼ t−α
d∑
j=1
KjEXαj ,
and when the object claims are asymptotically fully dependent,
P
( d∑
j=1
XjVj ≥ t
)
∼ t−αE
( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j Xj
)α
.
Proof. Proof: Due to the bipartite structure of the graph the indicators 1(deg(j) = 0) are
independent for j = 1, . . . , d. Let W = (1(deg(j) = 0, j = 1, . . . , d) be the vector of indicator
variables for the non-insured objects. Then from Theorem 10.A , p. 210 in [5],
sup
0≤f≤1
|Ef(W)− Ef(X1, . . . , Xd)| ≤
d∑
j=1
pi2j .
Here the functions f are measurable functions with values in the interval [0, 1]. Conditioning on
Vj , j = 1 = d, and using the function f(x1, . . . , xd) = 1
(∑d
j=1 xjVj ≥ t
)
gives the first assertion.
Due to the independence between the claim sizes and the network, by the law of total
probability,
P
( d∑
j=1
XjVj ≥ t
)
=
∞∑
n1,...,nd=0
( d∏
j=1
P(Xj = nj)
)
P
( d∑
j=1
njVj ≥ t
)
.
The standard asymptotics for Pareto claims can now be employed, similar as in the proof of
Theorem 3.2.
Remark 4.4. (a) The quantity E
(∑d
j=1K
1/α
j Xj
)α
can easily be approximated numerically
by standard methods. If the claims V1, . . . , Vd are exchangeable, so that in particular
Kj = K are the same for j = 1, . . . , d, the sum
∑d
j=1Xj has Poisson distribution with
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mean λ =
∑d
j=1 pij .
(b) Note that
∑d
j=1 pij is the expected number of non-insured objects. The Poisson approxima-
tion is good if none of the pij ’s is very large. For example, if pij ≈ d−1 for all j = 1, . . . , d,
then the bound in the Poisson approximation (4.6) is of order d−1. If pij = pj so that
the edge probabilities depend only on the object to be insured but not on the agent, then
pij = (1−pj)q and the bound in the Poisson approximation is
∑d
j=1(1−pj)2q. In particular
if pj ≈ 1− d− 1q , then pij ≈ d−1.
(c) From the perspective of a regulator the size of losses occurring in the uninsured objects
should be small. If the market allows for a too high amount of uninsured losses, it has failed
to work properly. Proposition 4.3 gives an indication for the probability of such market
failure for a large market. Not only does the number of noninsured losses play a role, but
the magnitudes of the losses in terms of the Kj ’s come into play.

For the number of claims, using Eq. (1.8), p. 4, in [5], a Poisson approximation for the
number W =
∑d
j=1 1(deg(j) = 0) of non-insured objects is immediate under the assumptions
of Proposition 4.1. Let λ =
∑d
j=1 pij and X Poisson distributed with mean λ. Then
sup
A⊂Z
|P(W ∈ A)− P(X ∈ A)| ≤ min{1, λ−1}
d∑
j=1
pi2j . (4.7)
For the approximation (4.7) of the number of non-insured objects, assume that there is a
constant c ≤ q such that pij = cd for all i, j; every object is equally likely to be insured, but the
total expected number of insurance links is kept at c, constant, while q may increase to infinity.
Then the expected number of non-insured objects is, for large d, EW = d
(
1− cd
)q ≈ de− cqd .
This expression tends to 0 with q even if q is of the same order as d.
When the number of agents increases faster than the number of objects, then there are
different limiting behaviours possible. If, for instance, q = αd log d for some α > 0, then the
expected number of uninsured objects tends to zero with d→∞ if α > 1c and tends to infinity
of α ≤ 1c . The bound on the Poisson approximation is at most
(
1− cd
)2q
and will tend to 0 in
both cases. Moreover, by Proposition 3.5, the probability of a large amount of uninsured losses
scales for t→∞ as P(∑dj=1 1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t) ∼ t−αd(1− p)q.
For the remainder of this section we first study some exemplifying network situations and
26
then highlight the observed common features.
4.2 Examples
Since our interest is in the graph structure, we take Kj = 1 in all examples, such that the
constants in (4.1) as well as (4.2) and (4.3) reduce further to
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
EAαij , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSind =
d∑
j=1
E‖Aej‖α=
d∑
j=1
P(deg(j) > 0),
if the claim variables V1, . . . , Vd are asymptotically independent, and to
Cidep = E(A1)αi , i = 1, . . . , q, and CSdep = E‖A1‖α= E
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) > 0)
)α
for asymptotically fully dependent claim variables. The larger these constants are, the larger are
the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation.
We discuss three quite different models for the probability matrix P = (pij)
q,d
i,j=1 of edge
probabilities and investigate the corresponding risk measures specified by the constants in (1.4)
and (1.5). The first model is a toy model which interpolates between complete specification
(one agent insures exactly one object) and full diversification (all agents insure all objects).
The second model assumes that all edge probabilities are identical, while the third model is a
Rasch-type model, assuming that the edge probabilities result as a product from the propensity
of an agent to insure objects and the attractivity of an object. Further models are plausible;
exogeneous variables such as location may play a role in that some agents may prefer to insure
objects which are in the same geographical location. Of course, our framework also applies to
deterministic graphs; i.e., pij ∈ {0, 1}, and the formulae naturally simplify.
4.2.1 A toy model
As a motivating and introductory example we regard a market structure with three agents and
three objects, where the random network is specified by the probability matrix
P =

1 b b2
b2 1 b
b b2 1
 . (4.8)
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for b ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that the market is completely specified if b = 0 and fully diversified if
b = 1.
In this example every object has degree at least 1 by construction, and hence with d = 3,
CSind = 3, and C
S
dep = 3
α.
The constants Ciind and C
i
dep can be regarded as functions of b. We can determine expecta-
tions by considering all possible realisations of the corresponding vectors, and we do so for Ciind
leaving out Cidep since calculations are just tedious here. Because of the structure of the matrix
P we know that Ciind are identical for i = 1, 2, 3. For agent 1 we get
C1ind =
3∑
j=1
EAα1j = (1− b2)(1− b) + 2
1
2α
((1− b2)b+ b2(1− b)) + 3 1
3α
b3
= 1 + b(21−α − 1) + b2(21−α − 1) + b3(31−α + 1− 22−α) (4.9)
Note that (4.9) decreases in b if α > 1, and it increases if α < 1. This means, from an individual
agent’s perspective, a more diversified network structure is preferrable for α > 1. Vice versa,
if α < 1 diversification makes things worse. This different impact of diversification has already
been observed in several related situations; cf. [26, 33, 38, 42, 45]. In contrast, such a clear
distinction cannot be observed for the market Value-at-Risk constant. Since every object is
insured, the systemic constants do not take further connectivity into account.
4.2.2 Homogeneous probabilities
Now we assume that the probability matrix P has identical entries; i.e., P = (p)q,di,j=1 and we
study the behaviour of Ciind and C
S
ind as functions of p ∈ [0, 1]. By homogeneity Ciind is the same
for all i. We compute
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
EAαij = d p
q−1∑
l=0
(1 + l)−α
(
q − 1
l
)
pl(1− p)q−1−l
and with s = 1− (1− p)q = P(deg(j) > 0),
CSind = ds and C
S
dep =
d∑
`=1
(
d
`
)
`αs`(1− s)d−`.
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Figure 2: Homogeneous probabilities: (Ciind)
1/α with black for α = 0.8, blue for α = 1, green for
α = 1.5, red for α = 3, orange for α = 5.
Moreover, with Zj , j = 1, . . . , d i.i.d. Binomial(q − 1, p) variables which are independent of
1(i ∼ j) we can write
Cidep = E
( d∑
j=1
1(i ∼ j)
1(i ∼ j) + Zj
)α
.
In comparison to the toy example in Subsection (4.2.1) we observe a different behaviour of
CSind. While in the toy example, increasing b had no effect on the systemic constants, for the
homogeneous case the constants are increasing in p. This can be explained as follows. In the
toy example every object is insured with probability 1 and the diversification effect starts from
the beginning. In contrast, for homogeneous probabilities and small p only few objects may be
insured at all. Increasing p increases the number of insured objects, assigning also more risk to
all agents. This behaviour is illustrated in Figure 3 (b) for both CSind and C
S
dep.
In Figure 2 we explore the influence of different choices of the tail index α on Ciind. We
recognize that diversification has a beneficial effect for higher values of p only for α > 1. In
particular, we see that a larger tail index (a lighter tail) causes higher values of Ciind (higher
risk) for very sparse networks, i.e. for very low values of p. The severity of smaller tail indices α
only arises for higher connected networks.
At this point, let us again consider the constants Cidep and C
S
dep; i.e., the case of fully
dependent claim variables. Figure 3 compares both types of network constants depending on
the parameter p ∈ [0, 1], on the left hand from a individual agent’s perspective and on the
right hand from a whole system perspective. A clear difference between the fully dependent
and the independent case is that the extent to which the tail index α influences the VaR
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constants vanishes as the network connectivity increases. We also recognize that over the full
range of p ∈ [0, 1], the network constants Cidep and CSdep are larger for larger tail indices α. This
relationship holds for independent claims only in the range of intermediate connectedness and
reverses as connectivity grows. We can also relate Figure 3 to the inequalities in Section 3.3. For
α > 1, independent of the particular market situation reflected by A, we have Cidep ≥ Ciind and
CSdep ≥ CSind whereas for 0 < α < 1 the reverse inequalities hold true.
4.2.3 A Rasch-type model
Random bipartite graphs can also be related to the Rasch models (cf. [39]) in social science.
These are given by taking pij =
βiδj
1+βiδj
. As a first order approximation of the probabilities in
the Rasch model we assume the pij to be of the form
pij = βiδj
for suitable βi, δj > 0. The parameter βi gives a measure for the risk proneness of agent i, while
the parameter δj reflects the attractiveness of object j.
For the random bipartite graph with pij = βiδj we have
CSind =
d∑
j=1
P(deg(j) > 0) =
d∑
j=1
(
1−
q∏
i=1
(1− βiδj)
)
(4.10)
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and for 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
EAαij =
d∑
j=1
βiδj
q−1∑
l=0
(l + 1)−α
∑
b∈{0,1}q,
bi=1,‖b‖1=l+1
q∏
k=1,
k 6=i
(βkδj)
1{bk>0}(1− βkδj)1{bk=0}.(4.11)
Moreover, by Proposition 3.5, the probability of a large amount of uninsured losses scales as
P
( d∑
j=1
1(deg(j) = 0)Vj > t
)
∼ t−α
d∑
j=1
q∏
i=1
(1− βiδj).
We discuss two particular cases.
Example 4.5 (Uniform risk proneness of agents). We take pij = βiδj constant in i; i.e., pij =
β δj . Then the formulae (4.10) and (4.11) simplify to
CSind =
d∑
j=1
(
1− (1− βδj)q
)
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
EAαij =
d∑
j=1
βδj
q−1∑
l=0
(l + 1)−α
(
q − 1
l
)
(βδj)
l(1− βδj)q−1−l.
For an illustration see Figure 4, where for the left hand plot we assume a market sit-
uation where one object is dominantly attractive in contrast to all the others; we choose
δ = (1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1), while for the right hand plot, we have a market in which only one
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Figure 5: Rasch model: (Ciind(δ))
1/α for different agents: black for i = 1, blue for i = 2.
object is unattractive opposed to the rest which is very attractive; we choose δ = (0.1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
Increasing the connectivity of the network by increasing the parameter β of risk proneness of
the agents uniformly leads to no actually observable effect of risk sharing in the left hand plot
in the sense of finally decreasing curves. This is in contrast to the right hand plot where we can
observe beneficial effects of risk sharing for α > 1 because a significant number of the objects
have the same attractiveness leading to a market situation quite similar to the homogenous case.
Example 4.6 (Uniform attractiveness of objects). We take pij = βiδ constant in j; i.e., pij =
βi δ. Then the formulae (4.10) and (4.11) simplify to
CSind =
d∑
j=1
(
1−
q∏
i=1
(1− βiδ)
)
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ q,
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
EAαij =
d∑
j=1
βiδ
q−1∑
l=0
(l + 1)−α δl(1− δ)q−1−l
∑
b∈{0,1}q,
bi=1,‖b‖1=l+1
q∏
k=1,
k 6=i
(βk)
1{bk>0}
(
1− βkδ
1− δ
)1{bk=0}
.
Figure 5 gives some insight in the univariate case. If only one key player is present, this key
player will not benefit from risk sharing, while the players in the rather inactive group finally
experience beneficial effects.
4.2.4 Degree dependence
One might wonder whether the constants in (1.4) may be described in terms of the summary
statistic of average object degree, even in a setting when the network grows. The following
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A˜1 =

1 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 1 0
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 · · · 1 1
1 0 0 · · · 0 1

A˜2 =

1 1 0
1 1 0
0 1 1
· · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · ·
1 1 0
1 1 0
0 1 1

Table 4.1: Two adjacency matrices, A˜1, and A˜2
example shows that this is not the case.
We consider two different networks which are deterministic with d = q (i.e. number of agents
is equal to number of objects) and given by their (bipartite) adjacency matrices. The adjacency
matrices are called A˜1 and A˜2, given in Table 4.1. For the sake of our argument we assume that
q is divisible by 3.
The corresponding random intersection graph assigns edges between all agents which insure
the same objects. So the graphs are very different, model 1 has one strongly connected compo-
nent, whereas model 2 decomposes in small independent components. Intuitively they would also
be very different concerning risk contagion. In both cases, however, the average agent degrees as
well as the average object degrees are equal to 2 – indeed in Model 1 all degrees equal 2. In our
framework we compare univariate and multivariate risk measures, where the difference between
univariate and multivariate is manifested in the univariate and multivariate network constants
from (1.4). We calculate that
Ciind(A˜1) = 2
1−α and
Ciind(A˜2) =
 2−α + 3−α if i(mod d) = 1, 2,1 + 3−α if i(mod d) = 0,
and hence the individual risk constants differ.
4.3 Diversification benefit
In this section we discuss the notion of diversification benefit in the networks setting, and its
relationship to the connectivity in the network.
It is well known that for i.i.d. random variables X1, . . . , Xq ∈ R(−α) the Value–at–Risk is
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asymptotically subadditive if α > 1 and asymptotically superadditive if α < 1:
lim
γ→0
VaR1−γ(X1 + · · ·+Xq)
VaR1−γ(X1) + · · ·+ VaR1−γ(Xq) ≤ 1 if α > 1,
lim
γ→0
VaR1−γ(X1 + · · ·+Xq)
VaR1−γ(X1) + · · ·+ VaR1−γ(Xq) ≥ 1 if α < 1,
with equality (additivity) for α = 1 (cf. [22, 26, 27, 38, 42]). Then
D := 1− lim
γ→0
VaR1−γ(X1 + · · ·+Xq)
VaR1−γ(X1) + · · ·+ VaR1−γ(Xq) (4.12)
has been interpreted as a diversification benefit (cf. [21, 26]). Clearly, in case of D > 0, the VaR
is asymptotically subadditive, in case of D < 0, the VaR is asymptotically superadditive, and
D = 0 is equivalent to asymptotical additivity of VaR. It is possible to calculate D also for the
Conditional Tail Expectation instead of the Value-at-Risk. By Lemma 3.8 the expression for D
is exactly the same.
In the context of a multivariate regularly varying vector F , with dependence introduced by
the random graph structure, we now discuss the influence of this graph structure on D and the
question of additivity. As we recognize in view of Proposition 3.7, insight about the effect of the
network structure on the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall, for the individual as well as
the market risk, is solely contained in the two constants Ciind and C
S
ind given in (1.4) where we
are now concerned with the 1-norm only. Calculating the quantity (4.12) using as notation (U
indicates the univariate setting and S as before the systemic setting)
CUind :=
q∑
i=1
(
Ciind
)1/α
=
q∑
i=1
( d∑
j=1
EAαij
)1/α
gives
D = 1− lim
γ→0
VaR1−γ(‖F‖1)∑q
i=1 VaR1−γ(Fi)
= 1−
(
CSind
)1/α
CUind
. (4.13)
Consequently, for a given tail index α, D depends not on the absolute size of the constants CUind
and
(
CSind
)1/α
, but on their ratio. Unfortunately, there is neither an ad hoc interpretation of
CUind or C
S
ind in terms of the network structure available, nor are they computable in a simple
way, particularly when dimensions are high; but the Poisson approximation in Proposition 4.1
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Figure 6: Diversification benefit for different tail indices α : orange for α = 1, blue for α = 5, green
for α = 3 , red for α = 0.8 and black for α = 0.7.
can be employed if the edge probabilities are not too large.
For the toy model (4.8) with r = 1 we calculate
D = 1− 3
1/α
3(1 + b(21−α − 1) + b2(21−α − 1) + b3(31−α + 1− 22−α))1/α .
This quantity is plotted in Figure 6 as a function of b, which shows that it increases in b for
α < 1 and decreases in b for α > 1, though being negative all the way. This means, that VaR is
superadditive, but gets additive for b = 1. The quantity D for the Rasch model is depicted in
Figure 7; the behaviour is qualitatively similar, but in these two examples D does not reach 0.
Whereas in Section 4.2 we have interpreted risk by the constants (1.4) and (1.5) (small
constants means small risk), we now focus on the definition of the diversification benefit in
(4.13). All of our examples share the feature that an increasing degree of connectivity in the
network implies an increasing D in the case of α < 1 and a decreasing D in the case of α > 1.
This is a simple consequence of the fact that the quantity in the numerator always decreases in
α, whereas the quantity in the denominator decreases for α > 1 and increases for α < 1. This
implies that trivially D increases for α < 1, whereas for α > 1 numerator and denominator
go in opposite directions, leading in our examples to a weak decrease. In case of α = 1, the
diversification benefit equals 0 for all degrees of connectivity in the network. If the degree of
connectivity reaches its maximum; i.e., in the particular case of a complete bipartite graph, when
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each agent insures each object with probability one, VaR is asymptotically additive. Indeed,
(
CSind
)1/α
CUind
=
(∑d
j=1
1
qα ‖(1, . . . , 1)>‖α1
)1/α
∑q
i=1
(∑d
j=1
1
qα
)1/α = 1. (4.14)
4.4 The issue of r-norms and quasinorms
In this final subsection we discuss the choice of the 1-norm and indicate alternative choices.
This discussion is based on the axiomatic framework for systemic risk which is suggested in [18],
[30] and [36]. This general framework assumes that a systemic risk measure ρ of a multivariate
risk F = (F1, . . . , Fq) can be represented as the composition of a univariate (single-agent)
risk measure ρ0 with an aggregation function Λ : Rq → Rq, so that ρ = ρ0 ◦ Λ. Here, ρ0
is usually assumed to be convex as well as monotone and positively 1-homogeneous; typical
examples are the univariate Value-at-Risk and Contitional Tail Expectation measures. While
detailed conditions on the aggregation function Λ vary, there is consensus that Λ should satisfy
Λ(ax) = aΛ(x) for a > 0, and Λ((1, . . . , 1)>) = q. The last condition is satisfied for example for
Λ = ‖ · ‖1 the 1-norm, but it is not satisfied for the norm or quasinorm ‖x‖r = (
∑q
i=1 |xi|r)1/r
for 0 < r < 1 or r > 1.
Here we briefly discuss the cases 0 < r < 1 or r > 1. For monotone ρ0, we have q <
‖(1, . . . , 1)‖r for 0 < r < 1 while q > ‖(1, . . . , 1)‖r for 1 < r ≤ ∞. While the constants in
Ciind and C
S
ind in (1.4), and C
i
dep and C
S
dep in (1.5) are still defined, they may increase faster or
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1/α for different norms: black for r = 1, orange for r = 2,
red for r = 5, blue for r = 10, green for the max-norm
increase slower, respectively, as the number of individual risks grows compared to the constants
when using the 1-norm as aggregation function.
Such effects can be desired to account for the assumption that risk in a larger market may
not increase strictly proportional to size, justifying using r > 1. Similarly, a small market in
which the regulator may strive for more risk capital than the sum of risks, or the desire by
a regulator to guard against moral hazard from the different institutions, may suggest to use
r < 1.
However, as indicated in Section 3.2, for r > 1 such a risk measure allows for regulatory
arbitrage! Any loss of size Vj could be made smaller by splitting it between more agents even
when the agents do not insure any losses, leading to a perverse interpretation of the risk mea-
sure. Hence r > 1 should be used with care, if at all. Figure 8 presents the risk constants for
different norms in case of the homogeneous model. The fact that for r > 1 risk decreases for
increasing p happens since the r−norms with r > 1 favour diversification. We stress that the
same mechanisms that allow for this diversification effect allow its interpretation as possibility
for regulatory arbitrage.
As a remedy we suggest to modify the weighted adjacency matrix A, incorporating such
weights Wij in (1.2) to satisfy ‖AijVj‖r = Vj . Here we concentrate on the case r > 1. Choosing
Wij = deg(j)
1−1/r gives
‖AijVj‖r =
( q∑
i=1
V rj
1(i ∼ j)
deg(j)1−r
)1/r
= Vj . (4.15)
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In this setting, for r > 1, each agent’s risk proportion is multiplied by deg(j)r. This implies that
the more agents insure an object, the more the risk is inflated.
This setting could serve as a model, when some agents default because of a large risks, then
the surviving agents take over the defaulting agent’s risk. Such types of contractual relationships
are realistic and have similarly been implemented for example in the German Reinsurance
Pharmapool or the German Nuclear Insurance Pool (see p.131 in [19]).
For (4.15) and r > 1 the individual constants take the form
Ciind =
d∑
j=1
KjE
(
deg(j)1−1/r1(i ∼ j)
)α
and Cidep = E
( d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j deg(j)
1−1/r1(i ∼ j)
)α
.
Furthermore, ||Aej ||r =
(∑q
i=1 1(i ∼ j)(deg(j))r−1
)1/r
= deg(j) and, hence,
CSind =
d∑
j=1
Kj deg(j)
α and CSdep = E
( q∑
i=1
(
d∑
j=1
K
1/α
j deg(j)
1−1/r1(i ∼ j))r
)α
r
.
In contrast to (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), all four constants are now increasing in the degree deg(j),
and for the systemic constants the size of the degrees matter beyond whether or not they are 0.
This observation is in contrast to our previous results and illustrates that the norm has to be
chosen very carefully in order to reflect the features of interest of the system.
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